On the Logical Evolution of Lukács’s Ethical Thought

In January 1971, Lukács gave two interviews in succession, repeatedly emphasizing that he was a cultural intellectual rather than a politician. His life’s writing proves this. Whether it is his early research on drama, aesthetics, and literature, his focus on class consciousness during the revolutionary period, or his later exploration of the ontology of social being, aesthetics, democratization, and other issues, it all shows that “the search for the inner meaning of life” was always his core theoretical concern. There is a representative view in academia that the development of Lukács’s ethical thought can be divided into a romanticist stage in the pre-Marxist period, a revolutionary ethics stage after accepting Marxism, and a stage of cultural critique and democratic political exploration in his later years. This view reflects the evolution of Lukács’s ethical thought to a certain extent, but it overlooks the following questions: Is the romanticist individual ethics in Lukács’s early thought opposed to the class ethics of the revolutionary period? Is Lukács’s later ethical thought completely unrelated to the ethical thought of the first two periods? Only within the holistic perspective of the triadic structure of “individual—class—species” can the evolutionary logic, theoretical essence, and contemporary effects of Lukács’s ethical thought be elucidated. Although Lukács did not systematically construct a Marxist ethics, his critique of dogmatized Marxism opened the way for the contemporary construction of Marxist ethics.

1971年1月，卢卡奇先后两次接受采访，反复强调自己是文化知识分子而不是政治家。他一生的写作证明了这一点。无论是其早期对戏剧、美学和文学的研究，还是在革命时期对阶级意识的关注，以及晚年对社会存在本体论、美学、民主化等问题的探讨，都表明，“追寻生活的内在意义”始终是其核心理论关切。学界有一种代表性观点，认为卢卡奇伦理思想的发展可分为前马克思主义时期的浪漫主义阶段、接受马克思主义后的革命伦理阶段、晚年的文化批判和民主政治探索阶段。这种观点在一定程度上反映了卢卡奇伦理思想的演变，但忽视了如下问题：卢卡奇早期思想中的浪漫主义个人伦理是否同革命时期的阶级伦理对立？卢卡奇晚年的伦理思想是否同前两个时期的伦理思想毫无关系？只有在“个体—阶级—类”三元结构的整体视域中才能阐明卢卡奇伦理思想的演进逻辑、理论实质和当代效应。卢卡奇虽未系统建构马克思主义伦理学，但他对教条化马克思主义的批判却为马克思主义伦理学的当代建构开辟了道路。

I. From Metaphysical Individual Ethics to the Class Ethics of the Proletariat

一、从形而上学的个体伦理 到无产阶级的阶级伦理

Academia generally takes Lukács’s joining the Communist Party and his turn to Marxism in 1918 as the boundary, dividing his thought into a pre-Marxist period and a Marxist period, with *Soul and Form* and *The Theory of the Novel* as representative works of the pre-Marxist period. The core theoretical aim of Lukács’s pre-Marxist period was the pursuit of the all-round development of individuality, with the individual seen as the only real existence. Unlike existentialist thought, which abstractly discusses the individual, Lukács attempted to “link the conditions for individual self-realization with suprapersonal forces.” In *The History of the Development of Modern Drama*, he repeatedly emphasizes the group, arguing that the individual is always influenced by a specific social atmosphere; in *The Metaphysics of Tragedy*, he emphasizes fate and the suprapersonal as superior to the individual: “The final expansion of the self goes beyond the merely individual. Its power elevates things to the sublime status of fate, but its great struggle with the fate it has created transforms it into something suprapersonal, a symbol of the ultimate relationship with fate.” In Lukács’s view, history is superior to the individual, because the individual must not only confront history but also rely on it; the development of individuality can only be completed within the universality of history. At the same time, he realized that abstract universality as a “totality” could potentially crush the individual, so the question became: “How to save those who fight for the integrity of life (which is considered equally desirable) from being dominated by irrational universality, from being degraded into blind tools in the hands of alien overseers?” In Lukács’s conceptual repertoire, the soul has a strongly positive connotation, first, in a metaphysical sense, meaning the foundational principle that humanity should follow in creating all social institutions and cultural works, and second, meaning individual personality. However, the reality is that capitalist society obscures the soul; therefore, form is needed to give shape to life. As the supreme judge of life, form is always associated with meaning and creativity, and is linked to some abstract ethical principle. At this time, Lukács was not yet a Marxist and lacked a profound understanding of capitalist contradictions; his individual ethics carried strong formalistic and metaphysical characteristics.

学界一般以1918年卢卡奇加入共产党和转向马克思主义为界，将其思想分为前马克思主义时期和马克思主义时期两个阶段，《心灵与形式》和《小说理论》是其前马克思主义时期的代表作。卢卡奇前马克思主义时期的核心理论旨趣是追求个性全面发展，个体被看成是唯一真实的存在。与存在主义思潮抽象地探讨个体不同，卢卡奇试图“把个人实现自我的条件与超个人的力量联系起来”。在《现代戏剧发展史》中，他多次强调群体，认为个体总会受到特定社会氛围的影响；在《悲剧的形而上学》中，他强调命运和超个人的东西高于个体：“自我的最后扩张越过了纯粹的个体性的东西。它的力量把事物拔擢到了命运的崇高地位，但是它与自己制造的命运的伟大斗争把它改造成了超个人的东西，以及终极命运关系的一个象征。”在卢卡奇看来，历史高于个体，因为个体不仅要直面历史，更要倚重历史，个性的发展只能在历史的普遍性中完成。同时，他意识到作为“大全”的抽象普遍性有可能将个体碾碎，于是问题转变为：“如何从被非理性的普遍性的统治下，从被贬低为异己的监工手中的盲目工具状态下拯救那些为生命的完整性（它们被认为是同样值得渴望的）而奋战的人？”在卢卡奇的概念库中，心灵具有强烈的正面色彩，一是在形而上学意义上意指人类在创造所有社会体制和文化作品时应遵循的基础性原则，二是意指个体个性。然而，现实情况是，资本主义社会遮蔽了心灵，因此，需要形式来为生活赋形。作为生命的最高法官，形式总是与意义和创造性相关，并与某种抽象的伦理原则相关联。这时，卢卡奇还未成为马克思主义者，对资本主义矛盾缺乏深刻的认识，其个体伦理思想带有浓厚的形式化特征和形而上学色彩。

After the outbreak of the First World War, Lukács moved from Kant to Hegel, marking his abandonment of the ethical conception of eternal form and his turn to Hegel’s philosophy of history, linking it to a left-wing ethics. Although the ideas in *The Theory of the Novel* are subversive, they are built on a naive, illusory utopian foundation, fantasizing that “the natural life that humans should have can emerge from the fragmentation of capitalism.” However, what are the fundamental contradictions of capitalist society? How to overcome alienation? These are questions that *The Theory of the Novel* cannot answer. After the outbreak of the October Revolution, Lukács continued to study ethical issues. During this period, he mainly studied ethics within the framework of the Marxist conception of form, with the core being to handle the relationship between individual ethics and class ethics, answering “how the individual’s conscience and sense of responsibility relate to the question of strategically correct collective action.” From the perspective of the philosophy of history, the question can also be formulated as: “What ethical considerations motivate an individual to judge that the indispensable historical-philosophical consciousness he possesses can be transformed into correct political action, i.e., a component of the collective will, and can determine such action.” The victory of the October Revolution made Lukács see the power of the proletariat, but he also recognized that if the proletariat did not fully realize its mission and strive for it, the socialist revolution could not succeed. Fundamentally, revolution not only has historical inevitability but is also people’s active choice of the historical path. The sense of historical mission and responsibility differs from scientific knowledge in the epistemological sense; its essence is an ethical value and moral commitment. But the problem is: Can the individual obtain correct ethics? Is individual ethics self-sufficient? Will class ethics suppress individuality? Lukács believed that to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish between tactics (immediate goals) and ethics (ultimate goals). The former is “the means by which a politically active group achieves its declared goals,” while the latter is a value concept related to class structure and the philosophy of history. Different classes have different ethics; the legitimacy of tactics depends on the character of the Party and class implementing the tactics and their ability to correctly grasp the philosophy of history. Specifically, ultimate goals are of two types: first, immanent ultimate goals, which accept the existing legal order as a given principle and believe that these principles necessarily determine the scope of all action; second, transcendent ultimate goals, which regard the legal order as actual power, to be considered at most as a matter of expediency. Lukács advocated a dialectical view of the two types of ultimate goals: one-sided emphasis on the former leads to an affirmation of reality, while one-sided emphasis on the latter leads to abstract utopia. Therefore, it is necessary both to emphasize that ultimate goals are superior to tactics, resisting the influence of short-term interests on tactics, and to emphasize that ultimate goals originate from reality, opposing the imposition of ideals on reality. Lukács also reminded people that correct socialist tactics must meet two conditions: first, a correct factual understanding of the social situation and power relations; second, a consistent adherence to the correct ethical orientation and value goals at the value level. However, the problem is: What exactly is correct ethics? Does it originate from the individual or the class? Lukács faced the following dilemma: on the one hand, collective action must express itself through the individual will; without individual ethics, it is difficult to imagine that an individual would choose to sacrifice personal interests when ultimate goals conflict with immediate interests; on the other hand, the relationship between tactics and ethics cannot be fully explained solely from the perspective of individual ethics. For socialists, morally correct action depends on a correct grasp of the philosophy of history, and only the proletariat, as the identical subject-object of history, possesses this ability.

第一次世界大战爆发后，卢卡奇从康德走向黑格尔，这标志着他放弃了永恒形式的伦理构想，走向了黑格尔的历史哲学，并将之同一种左翼伦理学联系在一起。《小说理论》中的思想虽然具有颠覆性，但却建立在天真、虚幻的乌托邦基础之上，幻想着“人应该具有的自然生活能够从资本主义的分裂中产生”。然而，资本主义社会的基本矛盾是什么？如何摆脱异化？这些问题并不是《小说理论》能够回答的。十月革命爆发后，卢卡奇继续研究伦理问题。这一时期主要是在马克思主义形式观的框架内研究伦理学，核心是处理个体伦理与阶级伦理的关系，回答“个人的良心和责任感如何与策略上正确的集体行动问题相联系”。从历史哲学的角度看，问题还可以表述为：“是什么伦理考量激发了个人作出判定，认为他所拥有的必不可少的历史—哲学意识可以被转化为正确的政治行动，即集体意志的组成部分，并且可以决定这种行动。”十月革命的胜利让卢卡奇看到了无产阶级的力量，但同时也认识到，无产阶级如果未能充分意识到自己的使命并为此而努力，社会主义革命便不可能成功。从根本上看，革命不仅具有历史必然性，更是人们对历史道路的主动选择。历史使命感和责任感不同于认识论意义上的科学知识，其实质是一种伦理价值和道德承诺。但问题在于，个体能否获得正确的伦理？个体伦理是不是自足的？阶级伦理是否会压制个性？卢卡奇认为，要回答上述问题，必须区分策略（直接目标）与伦理（终极目标），前者是“政治上活跃的团体实现其所宣称的目标的手段”，后者是与阶级结构和历史哲学相关的价值观念。不同阶级拥有不同的伦理，策略的合法性取决于执行策略的党和阶级的特性以及他们能否正确把握历史哲学。具体而言，终极目标又有两种：一是内在的终极目标，它将现存的法律秩序接受为给定的原则，并认为，这些原则必然决定一切行动的范围；二是超越的终极目标，它视法律秩序为现实的权力，至多仅可作为权宜之计来考量。卢卡奇主张，要辩证看待两类终极目标，片面强调前者会导致对现实的肯定，片面强调后者则会陷入抽象的乌托邦。因此，既要强调终极目标高于策略，抵制短期利益对策略的影响，又要强调终极目标源于现实，反对将理想强加给现实。卢卡奇还提醒人们，正确的社会主义策略必须满足两个条件：一是在事实层面正确理解社会形势和权力关系；二是在价值层面始终坚持正确的伦理导向和价值目标。然而，问题是，正确的伦理究竟是什么？它来源于个体还是阶级？卢卡奇面临着如下困境：一方面，集体行动必须通过个人的意志来表现自身，离开个体伦理，很难想象个人能够在终极目标和眼前利益发生冲突时会选择牺牲个人利益；另一方面，仅仅从个体伦理的角度还无法充分阐释策略和伦理的关系，对社会主义者而言，道德上的合理行动取决于对历史哲学的正确把握，而只有主客体同一的无产阶级才具有这种能力。

The ethical dilemma described above is directly reflected in the question of whether to support Bolshevism. At the time, some orthodox Marxists tended to make choices and judgments based on whether economic and social conditions were “ripe”; Lukács, by contrast, regarded this as fatalism and tailism. Like Lenin, Lukács placed greater weight on the subjective conditions of revolution, that is, whether class consciousness had developed to a mature stage. As noted earlier, Lukács believed that ethics and the philosophy of history are interconnected, and that socialism is “the idealized hypothesis of Marx’s philosophy of history; it is the ethical goal of an impending world order.” This means that communism cannot be directly deduced from class struggle, but must be fully grasped by the proletariat as an ultimate goal and put into action. István Mészáros held that Lukács’s ethical thought took as its basic background Russia, the “weakest link” in the imperialist chain. It is generally believed that “weak” refers to the insufficient development of capitalism in Russia and the lack of strength of the reactionary forces; but what Mészáros understood by “weak” was Russia’s lack of a tradition of the workers’ movement and its relative freedom from the influence of reformism and “economic determinism.” That is to say, unlike the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries of Western Europe, which was universally trapped in reification, the Russian proletariat could more easily establish correct class consciousness through the “external inculcation” of the Party’s advanced elements. In the end, in *Tactics and Ethics*, Lukács made his own choice, declaring that “adhering to the correct tactic is itself ethical.” This marked his choice of the Marxist faith and the cause of communism, for which he struggled all his life.

上述伦理困境直接反映在是否支持布尔什维主义这一问题上。当时，一些正统马克思主义者倾向于根据经济和社会条件是否“成熟”作出选择和判断；卢卡奇则认为，这是宿命论和尾巴主义。与列宁一样，卢卡奇更看重革命的主观条件，即阶级意识是否发展到成熟阶段。如前所述，卢卡奇认为，伦理学与历史哲学是相通的，社会主义是“马克思历史哲学的理想化的假设；它是一个即将到来的世界秩序的伦理目标”。这就意味着，共产主义不能直接从阶级斗争中推导出来，而是必须作为终极目标被无产阶级充分意识到并付诸行动。伊什特万·梅扎罗斯认为，卢卡奇的伦理思想是以俄国这一帝国主义链条上“最薄弱的环节”作为基本背景的。一般认为，“薄弱”指的是俄国资本主义发展不充分，反动势力的力量不够强大；但梅扎罗斯所理解的“薄弱”，指的是俄国缺乏工人运动传统，较少受到改良主义和“经济决定论”的影响。也就是说，与西欧发达资本主义国家的无产阶级普遍陷入物化不同，俄国无产阶级更容易经由党的先进分子的“外部灌输”而确立正确的阶级意识。最终，卢卡奇在《策略与伦理》中作出了自己的选择，即宣布“坚持正确的策略本身就是伦理的”。这标志着，他选择了马克思主义信仰和共产主义事业，并为此奋斗终身。

So how should we view the relationship between Lukács’s pre-Marxist ethics and the Marxist formal ethics of his period of intellectual transition? It must be admitted that there is indeed a rupture between the two. In his early years, Lukács was very close to Ernst Bloch, but after turning to Marxism he parted ways with him. For in Lukács’s view, when Bloch treated the economy as an objective thing and opposed it to inner things such as the soul, he fell into dualism. This view not only denies that “only a genuine social revolution can transform people’s concrete and actual life,” but also fails to recognize that “economic things are nothing but the system of objective forms of this actual life.” Bloch’s dualist philosophy not only bore a subjectivist character but also directly led to fatalism: when he regarded the socio-economic structure and its developmental process as an objective reality independent of human consciousness, the active role of consciousness could play no part. Unlike Bloch, after turning to Marxism, Lukács began to focus on the total structure of capitalist society and to understand the soul and form within that total structure. He did not abandon form, but at this point form was no longer a utopian fantasy; rather, it was the “form of existence” of capitalist society. In *Tailism and the Dialectic*, Lukács mentions the “capitalist shell” (form), arguing that it is not a mere appearance that can be removed by lifting a veil; its disappearance “can only occur in the actual historical process.” It can be seen that Lukács’s ethical thought underwent an important shift, and the Marxist view of form gradually gained the upper hand in his ethics. This directly led him to form the following two insights: first, human liberation can only be anticipated through a real social revolution; second, people can consciously influence the objective system of forms in their actual lives.

那么，如何看待卢卡奇前马克思主义时期的伦理学与思想转变期的马克思主义形式伦理学的关系？必须承认，二者之间确实存在断裂关系。卢卡奇早期曾与恩斯特·布洛赫走得很近，但转向马克思主义后却同他分道扬镳了。因为在卢卡奇看来，当布洛赫把经济视为客观事物，并将其同心灵等内在之物相对立时，便陷入了二元论。这种观点不仅否认只有“真正的社会革命才能变革人的具体而现实的生活”，而且不认同“经济学的东西无非就是关于这种现实生活的对象性形式的体系”。布洛赫的二元论哲学不仅带有主观主义色彩，还直接导致了宿命论，当他将社会经济结构及其发展进程视为不以人的意识为转移的客观实在时，意识的能动性便不可能发挥任何作用。与布洛赫不同，卢卡奇转向马克思主义后就开始关注资本主义社会的总体结构，并将心灵和形式纳入总体结构中加以理解。他并没有抛弃形式，但此时形式已不是乌托邦的玄想，而是资本主义社会的“生存形式”。在《尾巴主义与辩证法》中，卢卡奇提到“资本主义的外壳”（形式），认为它并非单纯的表象，决不能以揭开面纱的方式予以清除，其消失“只有在真实的历史进程中才能发生”。可见，卢卡奇的伦理思想发生了重要转变，马克思主义的形式观在其伦理思想中逐渐占据上风。这直接导致其形成了如下两点认识：一是人类解放只能通过现实的社会革命来展望，二是人们在现实生活中能够有意识地影响客观形式体系。

II. The Ethical Dilemma of *History and Class Consciousness*

二、《历史与阶级意识》的伦理困境

*History and Class Consciousness* is the representative work of Lukács’s Marxist apprenticeship, enjoying a high reputation in the history of Western Marxism, yet it also faced criticism from various quarters. By this time he had abandoned his early abstract individual ethics, affirming that the individual, as a lower self, must submit to the collective as a higher idea, and that collective action is superior to individual behavior. Lukács did not mean to disparage the individual; here “individual” refers mainly to “the individual of bourgeois society,” that is, the alienated individual. For such an individual, “reification and determinism (determinism being the idea that things are necessarily interconnected) are both ineradicable,” so the individual can never become the measure of things; only the class “can relate to the totality of reality and play an actual transformative role.” Lukács further argued that the bourgeoisie is necessarily trapped in immediacy, while only the proletariat can grasp the total society through mediation. Why, then, did the proletariat fail to fulfill its historical mission of overthrowing capitalist society? This is because “objective economic development can only endow the proletariat with the possibility and necessity of transforming society. But this transformation itself can only be the free act of the proletariat itself.” However, the reified structure of capitalist society gradually penetrates the class consciousness of the proletariat and forms reified consciousness, whose greatest characteristic is the bourgeois mode of immediate thinking. Therefore, the key to the proletariat’s victory in revolution lies in regaining class consciousness.

《历史与阶级意识》是卢卡奇马克思主义学徒期的代表作，在西方马克思主义发展史上享有盛誉，但也遭到各方人士的质疑。这时他已抛弃早期抽象的个体伦理思想，认定个人作为低级自我必须服从集体这个高级理念，并认为集体行动高于个体行为。卢卡奇并没有贬低个体的意思，这里的个体主要指“资产阶级社会的个体”，也就是异化的个体。对于这种个体而言，“物化和决定论（决定论就是认为事物必然是互相联系的思想）都是不可消除的”，所以个体决不能成为事物的尺度，只有阶级“才能和现实的总体发生关系并起到实际上的改造作用”。卢卡奇进一步认为，资产阶级必然限于直接性之中，而只有无产阶级才能凭借中介把握总体的社会。那么，无产阶级为什么没能实现推翻资本主义社会的历史使命呢？这是因为，“客观的经济发展只能赋予无产阶级以改造社会的可能性和必要性。但是，这一改造本身却只能是无产阶级自身的自由的行动”。然而，资本主义社会的物化结构逐渐渗入无产阶级的阶级意识并形成物化意识，物化意识最大的特点就是资产阶级的直接性思维。因此，无产阶级取得革命胜利的关键在于重获阶级意识。

Lukács offers four clarifications regarding class consciousness: first, it is neither the sum of individual thoughts nor their average; second, the class consciousness of the proletariat is not stable and unchanging but is constantly being generated; third, class consciousness is the “ethics” of the proletariat; fourth, the Party is “the pillar of proletarian class consciousness, the conscience of the proletariat’s historical mission.” In his view, the Party represents moral force, the visible and organized form of class consciousness; once the Party gains the general trust of the masses, the masses will surge toward the Party’s direction, toward the direction they themselves have become conscious of. The problem is: faced with the reified consciousness of the bourgeoisie, how can the broad masses of the proletariat, who are instinctively revolutionary but have not yet reached a clear stage of consciousness, be awakened? Lenin famously proposed the “theory of inculcation,” meaning that the class consciousness of the proletariat must be inculcated from outside; otherwise, only trade-union consciousness can be obtained. Lukács fully endorsed this view. In his view, the acquisition of proletarian consciousness is a long process, and the thought of the proletariat can never mature through a single revolution. Therefore, he opposed Rosa Luxemburg, arguing that she overestimated the maturity of proletarian thought and underestimated the Party’s core leadership role in revolution.

卢卡奇对阶级意识有四点说明：首先，它不是单个个人思想的总和，也不是其平均值；其次，无产阶级的阶级意识不是稳定不变的，而是不断生成的；再次，阶级意识是无产阶级的“伦理学”;最后，党是“无产阶级阶级意识的支柱，是无产阶级历史使命的良知”。在他看来，党代表着道义的力量，是阶级意识的可以看得见的和有组织的形态，一旦党取得群众的普遍信任，群众就会涌向党的方向，涌向自己意识到的方向。问题在于，面对资产阶级的物化意识，如何能够让那些本能是革命的但是还没有达到明确觉悟阶段的广大无产阶级群众醒悟过来呢？列宁曾提出著名的“灌输说”，意思是无产阶级的阶级意识必须从外部灌输进去，否则只能获得工联意识。卢卡奇完全赞同此观点。在他看来，无产阶级意识的获得是一个漫长的过程，无产阶级的思想决不可能通过一次革命就成熟起来。因此，他反对罗莎·卢森堡，认为她高估了无产阶级思想的成熟性，低估了党在革命中的核心领导作用。

It is generally believed that *History and Class Consciousness* contains two basic premises: first, the proletariat as the historical subject-object possesses an “imputed consciousness” that can ensure its vanguard character; second, the Communist Party, by virtue of its advanced and tightly organized form, represents the correct direction of collective ethics and can enable the proletariat to shed reified consciousness and regain class consciousness. Lukács repeatedly emphasized that the formation of proletarian class consciousness is a protracted process, during which it is highly likely to be eroded by bourgeois reified consciousness. Moreover, Party organizational building is also a process; only by continuously strengthening its own building and improving the quality of its members can the Party better attract the masses to its side. It is evident that the understanding of these two premises cannot be absolutized; otherwise, it would deviate from the original intent of Lukács’s thought. In *Tailism and the Dialectic*, Lukács frankly acknowledged the gap between the proletariat’s psychological consciousness and “imputed consciousness,” and argued that every Marxist must study the causes of this gap and apply correct methods to resolve this important issue. He also stressed that “imputed consciousness” is not innate to the proletariat but can be attained postnatally, and bridging the gap between the two forms of consciousness is precisely the important duty of the Party and its leaders. As for the bureaucratic tendencies existing in the Soviet socialist state and within the Party, they not only did not affect Lukács’s loyalty to the Party or his judgment of the Party’s vanguard character, but also provided an opportunity for his later exploration of the issue of democratization. In short, Lukács was deeply convinced that the proletariat’s regaining of class consciousness is the key to the victory of proletarian revolution and socialist construction, and that “actively intervening in the development process of proletarian class consciousness, moving it from its actual state to the objectively highest possible state,” is precisely the task of the proletarian party.

一般认为，《历史与阶级意识》中存在两个基本设定：一是作为历史主客体的无产阶级具有“被赋予的意识”，能确保无产阶级保持先进性；二是共产党凭借先进严密的组织形式，代表了集体伦理的正确方向，能够使无产阶级摆脱物化意识，重获阶级意识。卢卡奇反复强调，无产阶级阶级意识的形成是一个漫长的过程，其间极有可能会受到资产阶级物化意识的侵蚀；另外，党的组织建设也是一个过程，党只有不断加强自身建设，提高党员素质，才能更好地把群众吸引到自己这边来。可见，对上面两个设定的理解不能绝对化，否则就会偏离卢卡奇思想的本意。在《尾巴主义与辩证法》中，卢卡奇坦承无产阶级的心理意识与“被赋予的意识”存在差距，并认为每个马克思主义者都有必要研究造成差距的原因，并运用正确的方法解决这个重要问题。他还强调，“被赋予的意识”不是无产阶级先天具备的，而是后天可以达到的，弥合两种意识的差距正是政党及其领导人的重要职责。至于苏联社会主义国家和党内存在的官僚主义倾向，不仅丝毫没有影响卢卡奇对党的忠诚以及对党的先进性的判断，还为其晚期探讨民主化问题提供了契机。总之，卢卡奇深信，无产阶级重获阶级意识是无产阶级革命以及社会主义建设取得胜利的关键，而“主动干预无产阶级阶级意识的发展进程，使之从其现实所处的状态发展到客观上可能的最高状态”，正是无产阶级政党的任务。

In fact, the real dilemma of *History and Class Consciousness* is the relationship between the social material base and social consciousness. Although Lukács analyzed in detail the contradictions of capitalist commodity society, he attempted to directly intervene in and resolve these contradictions through social consciousness, in order to seek the complete emancipation of humanity. When he relied on a set of subjectivist tools and methods (totality, mediation, class consciousness) and attributed the core of solving the problem to the “external inoculation” of intellectuals who are politically loyal and morally strongly responsible, it indicated that he comprehensively underestimated the power of bourgeois class consciousness and the logic of capital.

事实上，《历史与阶级意识》的真正困境是社会物质基础与社会意识的关系问题。虽然卢卡奇详细分析了资本主义商品社会的矛盾，但却试图通过社会意识直接干预和解决这些矛盾，以寻求人类的彻底解放。当他倚重一套主观主义的工具和方法（总体性、中介、阶级意识）并将解决问题的核心归为政治上忠诚且道德上具有强烈责任感的知识分子的“外部灌输”时，便表明他全面低估了资产阶级阶级意识和资本逻辑的力量。

III. Lukács’s Late Ethical Thought: Seeking the Unity of the Individual and the Species

三、卢卡奇晚期的伦理思想：寻求个体和类的统一

After the 1956 Hungarian October Incident ended, Lukács began to write *The Specificity of the Aesthetic*. Influenced by the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, he realized that “class” cannot replace “species,” and the core of aesthetic research should be the unity of the individual and the species in art. Lukács continued his early thought on mediation, arguing that the artwork, as the concrete embodiment of the category of particularity, is mediation. Unlike other mediations, the artwork functions as a “middle term”; it “is, on the one hand, a work of man himself, and on the other hand, in its consequences, transcends its intentions, plans, hopes, etc.” In his view, the middle term has ethical significance. Unlike Kant’s absolute morality, the middle term is not a fixed point but “a region, a space of activity,” which enables consciousness to no longer remain at the two endpoints of individuality and universality, thereby achieving “the organic unity of man’s inwardness and the external world, the organic unity of man’s personality and his fate in the world.” In this sense, aesthetic activity is a unique movement; its starting point and endpoint both fall on particularity, “moving from particularity to universality and returning, or moving from particularity to individuality and likewise returning to the midpoint.” *The Specificity of the Aesthetic* also proposes the concept of the “whole person.” Lukács believed this is not only a theoretical conception but also a real existence, mainly referring to “the living totality of the public person, the private person, the state citizen, the person active in society, and the individual personality.” The artwork and the whole person are complementary: the artwork, through the effect of catharsis, draws the individual closer to the whole person, while the whole person, as the “model of humanity,” creates the artwork. But as Ágnes Heller questioned: “Where does the need for art arise? If our daily life and daily thinking are thoroughly fetishized, if we cannot elaborate the relationship between the individual and the species, or if we feel within ourselves no desire for such a relationship, how can art, through its power of appeal, elevate us to the level of ‘species characteristics’? Furthermore, how does creation itself occur?” It was precisely this theoretical dilemma that prompted Lukács to turn to the study of Marxist ethics.

1956年匈牙利十月事件结束后，卢卡奇开始创作《审美特性》。受《1844年经济学哲学手稿》影响，他意识到，“阶级”不能代替“类”，美学研究的核心应是个体和类在艺术中的统一。卢卡奇延续了早期关于中介的思想，认为作为特殊性范畴之现实体现的艺术品就是中介。与其他中介不同，艺术品充当着“中项”的功能，它“一方面是人本身的作品，另一方面在其后果中超越了其意图、计划、希望等”。在他看来，中项具有伦理学的意义，与康德的绝对道德不同，中项不是固定的点，而是“一个区域，一个活动空间”，这便使意识不再停留在个体性和普遍性两个端点上，进而能够实现“人的内在性与外在世界的有机统一，人的人格与他在世界上的命运的有机统一”。在这个意义上，审美活动是一种独特的运动，它的出发点和终结点均落在特殊性上，“由特殊性达到普遍性并返回，或者由特殊性达到个别性同样再返回中点”。《审美特性》还提出了“完整的人”这一概念。卢卡奇认为，这不仅是理论构想，也是现实存在，主要指“公众、私人、国家公民、在社会中起作用的人和个别的人格的生动的整体”。艺术品和完整的人是互补关系，艺术品通过净化作用让个体向完整的人靠拢，完整的人则作为“人的典范”创造艺术品。但正如阿格妮丝·赫勒质疑的：“对艺术的需要从何处产生？如果我们的日常生活和日常思维是彻底拜物教化的，如果我们不能详细阐述个体同类的关系，或者，如果我们无论如何都觉得自己内在没有对这样一种关系的渴望，艺术如何能够通过自己的召唤的力量把我们提升到‘类特征’的水平上？进而，创作本身是如何发生的？”正是这一理论困境促使卢卡奇转向马克思主义伦理学研究。

*The Ontology of Social Being* (hereinafter *Ontology*) is one of the most important works of Lukács’s later years. According to his original plan, this work was to be the introduction to his Marxist ethics. The core category of *Ontology* is labor. Starting from Hegel’s discussion of the relationship between freedom and necessity, Lukács emphasized that labor realizes the identity of subject and object; it contains both causality and teleology and is the basis of human social existence. Lukács’s sudden interruption of the writing of *Ontology* to turn to the study of democratization had a certain inevitability. On the one hand, this was related to the “ills” of the Soviet socialist system exposed by political events such as the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the Prague Spring [7]7 The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1956) saw Khrushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin’s cult of personality. The Prague Spring (1968) was a period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia crushed by Warsaw Pact invasion. Both events exposed systemic problems in Soviet-style socialism.; on the other hand, it was related to the shift in the era’s theme from socialist revolution to socialist construction. If in the past Lukács regarded the class consciousness of the proletariat as true ethics and emphasized the importance of “external inoculation” by the Party’s advanced elements, at this time he paid more attention to organizational and political system building, i.e., the issue of democratization. As István Mészáros said: “The strategy of ‘external [inoculation]’ can at most enable workers to acquire the consciousness necessary for seizing political power to fundamentally change their own social conditions—this is undoubtedly important—but it cannot tell the masses how to build and manage a new society.” Norman Levine argued: “*The Process of Democratization* must be read as essentially an anti-*State and Revolution* text.” This does not mean that Lukács opposed Lenin, but rather that the former attempted to transcend the traditional Marxist political framework of “withering away of the state,” and thus represents an innovative development of Lenin’s theory of the state.

《关于社会存在的本体论》（以下简称《本体论》）是卢卡奇晚年最重要的著作之一。按照他的原初设定，这部作品应该是其马克思主义伦理学的导言。《本体论》的核心范畴是劳动。从黑格尔关于自由和必然关系的论述出发，卢卡奇强调，劳动实现了主客体的同一，它内含因果性和目的性，是人类社会存在的基础。卢卡奇突然中断《本体论》的写作转而研究民主化问题具有一定必然性，这一方面与苏共二十大、“布拉格之春”等政治事件暴露出的苏联社会主义制度的“弊病”有关，另一方面与时代主题由社会主义革命转向社会主义建设有关。如果说卢卡奇过去将无产阶级的阶级意识视为真正的伦理，强调党的先进分子“从外部灌输”的重要性，这时则更注重组织和政治制度建设，即民主化问题。诚如梅扎罗斯所言：“‘从外部[灌输]’的战略至多可以使工人获得为根本改变自身的社会条件而夺取政权所必须拥有的意识——这毫无疑问是很重要的，但是，这样做却不能告诉人民群众如何建设和管理新社会。”诺曼·莱文认为：“《民主化的进程》必须作为实质上的反《国家与革命》文本而被阅读。”这并不是说卢卡奇反对列宁，而是指前者试图超越传统马克思主义政治学“消灭国家”的理论框架，因此，是对列宁国家理论的创新性发展。

The greatest theoretical achievement of Lukács’s later years was the marriage of political science and ethics, an important step in his escape from subjectivist ethics. *The Process of Democratization* is not only part of his research plan on ethics but also a crucial link in his advocated “revitalization of Marxism.” Based on the *Ontology*’s postulate of the teleology of labor, Lukács held that socialism means not only economic abundance but, more importantly, democracy in both economy and politics, because only the latter can guarantee the free and comprehensive development of every individual. In his view, capitalist democracy and socialist democracy are completely opposed: “every attempt to replace socialist democracy with a bourgeois variant inevitably leads to the murder of socialism.” The fundamental defect of capitalist democracy is the complete separation of the individual and the species: “man himself, due to economic needs, is unable to raise himself to a true species-being, i.e., essential human existence.” Lukács attempted to understand the difference between the two systems from the perspective of the relationship between determinism (causality) and teleology: “In the growth of socialist humanity, the essential change lies in the fact that economic development will henceforth be governed by a universal teleology. This teleology, not defined as the objective law of causality, must be understood as the conscious design of the human subject, the self-determination of the species in social development.” It is precisely in *The Process of Democratization* that Lukács broke through the *Ontology*’s abstract analysis of general human labor and turned to questioning the specific form of labor in capitalist society. Standing on Marx’s ground, he criticized Adam Smith’s labor theory of value, targeting a historically specific form of labor that treats labor as sacrifice and measures commodity value by the quantity of labor (labor time). In Marx’s view, this labor and its value form are nothing but theft, and “once direct labor ceases to be the great source of wealth, labor time ceases and must cease to be the measure of wealth.” Lukács further distinguished two kinds of value: value in capitalist society is based on direct human labor and exchange value, its external manifestation being material wealth; this kind of labor is essentially alienated labor. Value in socialist society takes the enhancement of humanity’s total creative capacity as its goal; the accumulation of material wealth is only a means, and its ultimate end is the free and comprehensive development of every individual. In short, although communist society is also subject to causal necessity, it is guided to a greater extent by universal teleology and can therefore achieve the unity of the individual and the species.

卢卡奇晚年最大的理论成就是实现了政治学与伦理学的联姻，这是他摆脱主观主义伦理学的重要一步。《民主化的进程》不仅是其伦理学研究计划的一部分，也是其所主张的“复兴马克思主义”的重要环节。基于《本体论》对劳动目的论的设定，卢卡奇认为，社会主义不仅意味着经济上富足，更在于经济和政治上民主，因为只有后者才能保证每个人的自由全面发展。在他看来，资本主义民主和社会主义民主是完全对立的，“每一次用资产阶级的变体取代社会主义民主的企图都不可避免地导致对社会主义的杀戮”，资本主义民主的根本缺陷是个体和类完全割裂，“人本身由于经济需求而不能够使自己上升到真正的类存在，即本质性的人类存在”。卢卡奇试图从决定（因果）论和目的论的关系角度理解两种制度的区别：“在社会主义人性的成长中，本质上的改变在于经济发展从此以后将由普遍的目的论来管理。这种目的论，不是定义为因果性的客观法则，必须被理解为社会发展中类的自我决定的人类主体意识设计。”正是在《民主化的进程》中，卢卡奇突破了《本体论》对一般人类劳动的抽象分析，转而对资本主义社会特定的劳动形式提出质疑。他站在马克思的立场上批判亚当·斯密的劳动价值论，将矛头指向一种历史性的特殊劳动形式，该形式把劳动视为奉献，根据劳动量（劳动时间）衡量商品价值。在马克思看来，这种劳动及其价值形式不过是盗窃，而“一旦直接形式的劳动不再是财富的巨大源泉，劳动时间就不再是，而且必然不再是财富的尺度”。卢卡奇进一步区分了两种价值：资本主义社会的价值以直接的人类劳动和交换价值为基础，其外在表现是物质财富，这类劳动本质上是异化劳动；社会主义社会的价值以人类总体创造能力的提高为目的，物质财富的积累只是手段，其最终目的是每个人的自由全面发展。总之，共产主义社会虽然也受制于因果必然性，但却在更大程度上接受普遍目的论的指引，因此，能够实现个体和类的统一。

In Lukács’s view, socialist democracy will play an important role in the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. Socialist democracy is by no means the representative democracy of modern bourgeois society, nor the polis democracy of ancient society, but a democracy capable of achieving the unity of the individual and the species. This democracy is embodied not only in macroscopic political institutions but also in microscopic daily life. “Without the reconstruction of the external world of human daily life, such an internal transformation of humanity cannot be realized. Regardless of whether material production has developed to a high level, unless human daily life becomes not only the arena of political decision-making but also the foundation of social existence, a communist society cannot emerge.” The problem is: “how can socialist democracy penetrate into human daily life, activate it, and assume a participatory character.” Lenin once advocated replacing coercion with habit and proposed the idea of “communist Saturday voluntary labor.” [8]8 “Communist Saturday voluntary labor” (subbotniks) refers to unpaid voluntary work on Saturdays, initiated by Communist Party members in Soviet Russia in 1919 and praised by Lenin as a manifestation of communist consciousness and a step toward the transition from capitalism to communism. Lukács greatly admired this, seeing it as the starting point of the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. In fact, Marx had already put forward the idea of voluntary labor in *Capital*. In his view, the society of associated producers establishes a new structure of needs; individuals correspondingly transform into new people, who no longer regard duty as external compulsion but as an internal moral motive. Here, “must” and “ought” achieve unity. In short, the transition from the old society to the new society signifies not only an economic and institutional transformation but also a moral transformation. Whether democracy is regarded as a temporary tactic or an integral part of this transformation will be the key to success or failure.

在卢卡奇看来，社会主义民主将在从必然王国向自由王国的飞跃中发挥重要作用。社会主义民主决不是现代资产阶级社会的代议制民主，也不是古代社会的城邦式民主，而是能够实现个体和类的统一的民主。这种民主不仅体现在宏观的政治制度上，还体现在微观的日常生活中。“没有人类日常生活的外部世界的重建，这样一场人类的内部变革就不可能实现。不管物质生产有没有发展到一个高水平，除非人类的日常生活不但变成政治决策的场所，而且成为社会存在的基础，否则都不可能出现共产主义社会。”问题在于，“社会主义民主怎样才能渗入到人类的日常生活并使之活跃起来，并具备参与的性质”。列宁曾主张用习惯来代替强制，并提出“共产主义星期六义务劳动”的设想。卢卡奇对此大加赞赏，认为这是从必然王国向自由王国飞跃的起点。其实，马克思在《资本论》中已经提出义务劳动的设想。在他看来，联合生产者的社会建立了新的需要结构，个体相应地转变为新人，他们不再把义务视为外在的强制，而是视为内在的道德动机，在这里，“必须”与“应该”实现了统一。总之，旧社会向新社会的过渡不仅意味着经济和制度的转变，还意味着道德的转变，在转变过程中把民主视为临时策略还是其重要的组成部分，将成为决定成败的关键。

For Lukács, democratization is always associated with creativity, species-being, teleology, and the like. As he points out: “Socialist democracy—treating people as active creators, which is the true attribute of their species-being, because they are forced to be active in their daily practice—transforms the objectifications or objective results of human labor into objects consciously created by humans and satisfying human purposes.” Therefore, democracy is the conquest of blind objectivity and the victory of self-determination: “Under socialism, the subjective controls the objective. Under socialism, the mode of human labor must conform to the species-being of humanity; human existence becomes the standard and guiding principle for organizing the conditions of labor.” Lukács realized that the humanization of labor cannot originate solely from the sphere of production but must receive moral and practical support from political subjects, which requires the establishment and improvement of socialist democracy. As when he wrote *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács believed that the masses’ correct understanding of socialist democracy cannot arise spontaneously but requires the stimulation of external factors, and “the natural leaders and driving force for establishing this goal-orientation must be the Communist Party.” Until the moment of his death, Lukács remained convinced that new forms of democratization would inevitably emerge in the history of human society.

在卢卡奇那里，民主化总是与创造性、类本质、目的论等相关联。如他指出：“社会主义民主——把人当作主动的创造物，而这是人的类存在的真实属性，因为他在每天的实践中被迫变得主动——将人类劳动产生的客观化的或者客观的结果转化为人的有意识创造的并且满足人类目的的客体。”因此，民主就是对盲目客观性的征服以及自我决定的胜利，“在社会主义制度下，主观控制着客观。在社会主义制度下，人类劳动的模式必须与人的类存在相符合，人的存在成为组织劳动条件的标准和指导原则”。卢卡奇意识到，劳动的人性化不能仅源于生产领域，而是必须得到政治主体道义上和行动上的支持，这就需要建立和健全社会主义民主。与写作《历史与阶级意识》时一样，卢卡奇认为，民众对社会主义民主的正确理解不可能自发产生，而是需要外部因素的激发，而“建立这种目标取向的天生领袖和推动力必须是共产党”。直到病逝前一刻，卢卡奇仍坚信，民主化的新形式必将在人类社会历史中出现。

IV. An Evaluation of Lukács’s Ethical Thought

四、对卢卡奇伦理思想的评价

A correct evaluation of Lukács’s ethical thought should adhere to two basic principles: first, the unity of continuity and discontinuity; second, proceeding from the specific historical context. For the convenience of analysis and exposition, one can divide Lukács’s ethical thought into different stages—for example, holding that in his pre-Marxist period he emphasized individual ethics, in the revolutionary period class ethics, and in his later period democratic political ethics. But this interpretive model not only overlooks the organic connections between his theories from different periods but may also forget the eternal and unchanging things that a great thinker guards throughout his life. István Mészáros firmly believed that a substantial intellectual never empties himself with every shift in the cultural-political wind; genuine intellectual progress must be an organic process of continuous deepening. György Márkus held that culture was Lukács’s sole thought; here, culture concerns human existence and destiny, representing an absolute meaning and value, and is essentially also ethics. In fact, whether it was his turn to Marxism in 1918 or his shift from class ethics to an ethics of the unity of the individual and the species, no irrational chasm appears in the evolution of Lukács’s ideas; rather, the driving forces behind the changes were the transformations of the times and the dilemmas of his own theory. Therefore, in evaluating Lukács’s ethical thought, two questions must be clarified: first, what was the problem of the times? Second, what was Lukács’s own theoretical dilemma? This does not mean always making a sympathetic interpretation of Lukács’s thought, but rather grasping it concretely within its specific social context. Following this logic, one cannot simply conclude that his early individual ethics was romanticism, his revolutionary period class ethics was subjectivism, and his later democratic political ethics was political radicalism. Instead, one should see that the ethical thought of each period has its specific background, and that there are also points of intersection between these thoughts. For example, *The Specificity of the Aesthetic* can be seen as a return to his early aesthetic thought; *The Process of Democratization* as a development of his early classical democratic theory; and *The Ontology* as an overcoming of the subjectivist defects of *History and Class Consciousness*. And from the perspective of deep continuity, behind Lukács’s ethical thought lies “a steadfast cultural watch based on a profound concern for human existence and destiny.”

正确评价卢卡奇的伦理思想应坚持两个基本原则：一是连续性和非连续性的统一，二是要从具体的历史语境出发。为了便于分析和叙述，人们可以将卢卡奇的伦理思想分为不同阶段，比如，认为他在前马克思主义时期侧重个体伦理，在革命时期侧重阶级伦理，在晚期侧重民主政治伦理。但这种解读模式不仅会忽略其不同时期理论之间的有机关联，还可能会遗忘伟大思想家一生守护的永恒不变的东西。梅扎罗斯坚信，有分量的知识分子决不会在每次文化—政治风向转变时清空自己，真正的思想进展一定是不断深化的有机过程。乔治·马尔库什认为，文化是卢卡奇唯一的思想，这里的文化关乎人的存在和命运，代表着一种绝对的意义和价值，本质上看也是一种伦理。事实上，无论是1918年转向马克思主义，还是从阶级伦理转向个体和类相统一的伦理，卢卡奇的观念演变中并未出现非理性的鸿沟，毋宁说，引发变化的动因是时代的变化和自身理论的困境。因此，在评价卢卡奇的伦理思想时必须弄清两个问题：一是时代问题是什么？二是卢卡奇自身的理论困境是什么？这并不意味着永远对卢卡奇的思想作出同情式的理解，而是要将其置于特定的社会背景中具体把握。按照这个逻辑，就不能简单地认定，其早期的个体伦理思想是浪漫主义，革命时期的阶级伦理思想是主观主义，晚期的民主政治伦理思想是政治激进主义；而是应该看到，其不同时期的伦理思想都有其特定背景，并且这些思想之间也存在交错之处，例如，《审美特性》可被视为其早期美学思想的回归，《民主化的进程》可被视为对早期古典民主理论的发展，《本体论》可被视为对《历史与阶级意识》主观主义缺陷的克服。而从深层的连续性上看，在卢卡奇伦理思想的背后是“一种基于对人类生存和命运的深深关切而矢志不渝的文化守望”。

Lukács systematically constructed an ethical thought with a trinity of “individual—class—species.” In his early period, starting from Neo-Kantianism and the philosophy of life, he attempted to resist the currents of scientism and positivism through individual ethics and aesthetic activity. However, “his anti-capitalist thought did not proceed from an orthodox socialist perspective, but from the perspective of a solitary romantic individual.”[9]9 Ferenc Fehér, “Lukács in Weimar,” in *Lukács Revalued*, ed. Agnes Heller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 76. In *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács moved from individual ethics to class ethics, emphasizing that only the proletariat can successfully overthrow capitalist society. Yet he also held that, under the influence of reified consciousness, even if a crisis erupts in capitalist society, the proletariat cannot promptly and actively overthrow it. In “The Methodology of the Problem of Organization,” he stressed: “The class consciousness of the proletariat does not develop in parallel with the objective economic crisis, nor in the same way throughout the entire proletariat. The majority of the proletariat remains ideologically influenced by the bourgeoisie; even the most severe economic crisis cannot shake their attitude. As a result, the attitude of the proletariat, its reaction to the crisis, is far less intense than the crisis itself.”[10]10 Georg Lukács, “The Methodology of the Problem of Organization,” in *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 304. Lukács’s conclusion was that the proletariat can successfully overthrow capitalist society only when it regains class consciousness under the correct guidance of the Communist Party. Overall, Lukács’s class ethics ignored the role of real factors such as the state apparatus and still bore an idealist character. As Gareth Stedman Jones analyzed, Lukács mistakenly equated the acquisition of proletarian consciousness with the attainment of social leadership and even revolutionary victory itself. According to this understanding, “once the proletariat acquires the correct consciousness of capitalist society and thereby completes the mission of the unity of historical subject and object, it will eliminate capitalism in the final ‘form of internalization.’”[11]11 Gareth Stedman Jones, “The Marxism of the Early Lukács,” *New Left Review* I/70 (November–December 1971), p. 39. This is clearly identical to the movement of Hegel’s absolute spirit. However, in his short work *Lenin*, Lukács turned completely toward Marxism-Leninism. The party is not only seen as the vanguard that awakens the masses but also forms a dialectical interaction with the working class; it must constantly listen to the voices of the masses and learn from them. This both upheld the centralized leadership of the Communist Party and emphasized the collective wisdom and initiative of the masses, dialectically grasping the party-mass relationship, and breaking free from the negative influence of Luxemburgism.[12]12 Luxemburgism refers to the political theory of Rosa Luxemburg, which emphasized mass spontaneity and criticized the vanguard party’s centralized leadership; Lukács here distances himself from this position. After studying Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, the focus of Lukács’s ethical thought shifted again, from class to species. However, this does not mean he returned to early ethical idealism; rather, it indicates that he completely abandoned the romantic anti-scientist stance and began to emphasize the liberating role of science, industry, and practice. Thus, the unity of the individual and the species was no longer an abstract ethical value postulate but was grounded in the real foundation of science, technology, and labor activity.

卢卡奇系统建构了“个体—阶级—类”三位一体的伦理思想，他早期从新康德主义和生命哲学出发，试图以个体伦理和审美活动抵制科学主义和实证主义思潮，但其“反资本主义思想并不是从一种正统的社会主义角度出发来进行的，而是从一种孤独的浪漫主义个体这个角度出发来进行的”。在《历史与阶级意识》中，卢卡奇从个体伦理走向阶级伦理，强调唯有无产阶级才能成功推翻资本主义社会。但他同时认为，在物化意识的影响下，即便资本主义社会爆发危机，无产阶级也无法及时主动地推翻资本主义社会。在《关于组织问题的方法论》中，他强调说：“无产阶级的阶级意识并不是和客观经济危机平行，在整个无产阶级中以同样的方式发展的。无产阶级的大部分仍然在思想上受资产阶级的影响；甚至最严重的经济危机也不能动摇他们的态度。结果是，无产阶级的态度、它对危机的反应远不及危机本身的激烈程度。”卢卡奇的结论是，无产阶级只有在共产党的正确引领下重获阶级意识，才能成功推翻资本主义社会。总体上看，卢卡奇的阶级伦理思想忽略了国家机器等现实因素的作用，仍带有唯心主义的色彩。诚如加里斯·斯特德曼·琼斯分析的那样，卢卡奇错误地将获得无产阶级意识等同于获得社会领导权乃至革命胜利本身了，按照这种理解，“一旦无产阶级获得关于资本主义社会的正确意识，从而完成历史的主客体统一这一使命之后，它就会在最终的‘内化形式’中消灭资本主义”。这显然与黑格尔的绝对精神运动如出一辙。不过，在其短篇著作《列宁》中，卢卡奇彻底转向了马克思列宁主义，政党不仅被视为唤醒大众的先锋，而且与工人阶级之间形成辩证互动，它必须不断聆听大众的声音，向大众学习。这就既坚持了共产党的集中领导，又强调了群众的集体智慧和能动性，辩证把握了党群关系问题，摆脱了卢森堡主义的消极影响。在研读马克思的《1844年经济学哲学手稿》后，卢卡奇伦理思想的重心再次发生变化，即从阶级转向类，但这并不意味着他重新回到早期的伦理唯心主义，而是表明他彻底离开浪漫主义的反科学主义立场，开始强调科学、工业、实践的解放性作用。于是，个体和类的统一不再是抽象的伦理价值悬设，而是建立在科学技术和劳动活动这一现实基础之上。

Lukács’s ethical thought had a tremendous influence on 20th-century Western Marxism, especially on Eastern European Neo-Marxism. Yet, as Lukács himself emphasized years later in the “New Preface” to *History and Class Consciousness*, “the theoretically erroneous parts often have the greatest influence.”[13]13 Georg Lukács, “Preface to the New Edition (1967),” in *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. xxv. Therefore, we must persist in treating his thought with a critical attitude.

卢卡奇的伦理思想对20世纪西方马克思主义尤其是东欧新马克思主义产生了巨大影响。然而，正如卢卡奇多年后在《历史与阶级意识》“新版序言”中强调的，“理论上错误的部分往往影响最大”。因此，我们要坚持以批判的态度对待其思想。